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We analyze optimal dynamic taxation when labor supply is indivisible, as in Hansen (1985) 
and Rogerson (1988). Markets are complete, and an employment lottery determines who 
works. The consumer can buy insurance to diversify this extrinsic income uncertainty. The 
optimal wage tax is zero in both the short and long run only when leisure is neutral. If 
leisure is normal (inferior), labor should be taxed (subsidized). We further derive a wide 
range of preferences, including HARA, which encompasses normal and non-normal 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
There are two ways of introducing second-best government policy in a competitive 
equilibrium. The first is when the government has to raise an exogenously specified 
amount of revenue without recourse to lump-sum taxation. The second-best tax system 
then minimizes the distortions.
2 The second alternative is to highlight the redistributive 
role of the government when individuals are heterogeneous in terms of factor ownership. 
The government then resorts to distortionary taxation for redistributive reasons. Under 
both approaches considerable research has been devoted to finding the optimal capital-
income tax. The central result is typically that the optimal capital-income tax is zero in 
the steady state. This is the well-known Chamley-Judd result (Judd, 1985 and Chamley, 
1986).
3 
Relatively less attention has been devoted to analyzing the second-best labor 
income taxation.
4 In particular, one may question whether the labor income tax is also 
zero in the steady state. If the government can accumulate capital, it could raise all 
necessary revenues by taxing capital and labor at the beginning of the optimization 
period, and set all taxes zero at the steady state. In Chamley’s framework, the labor tax is 
indeed positive in the steady state if leisure is non-inferior (see Renström, 1999). 
However, both Chamley and Judd assume that labor is divisible, in the sense that the 
household can choose the number of hours to work.  Following the work of Hansen 
(1985), a new stream of real business cycle literature treats labor supply as indivisible.
5 In 
this paper, we generalize the Chamley model to allow for indivisible labor supply (as in 
                                                            
2 In the second best the government designs an optimal dynamic tax formula at date zero, and remains 
precommitted to it (i.e. the government chooses all future consumer prices at date zero). If lump-sum 
taxation is allowed, the analysis reduces to the first-best. 
3 While Chamley (1986) takes the first view of second-best taxation where the government is just revenue 
raising, Judd (1985) views the government as redistributive. The zero capital-income tax is a result robust 
to several generalizations, see Renström (1999) and Atkeson et. al. (1999) for surveys. 
4 In a model with divisible labor, Chamley (1985) analyzes second-best wage taxation in absence of a 
capital tax. His model provides useful insights about the marginal excess burden of taxation, and time 
inconsistency of the wage tax. He suggests in his conclusion that the exact tax policy depends on the utility 
function. We explore this idea further, and show the explicit linkage between the form of the utility 
function, and the optimal wage tax in an environment with a capital taxation and indivisible labor. 
5 Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988) establish that indivisible labor explains aggregate fluctuations better 
than models with divisible labor. A subsequent literature explored further into the business cycle 
implications of indivisible labor (see Greenwood and Huffman, 1988, Hansen and Sargent, 1988). Mulligan 
(1999) points out that the tax implications are different for these two classes of models.     
   3 
Hansen, 1985 and Rogerson, 1988). Contrary to Hansen-Rogerson, we allow utility to be 
non-separable in leisure.   
   Why is the issue of optimal taxation in an environment with indivisible labor 
worth exploring? When labor supply is indivisible, the household faces a choice between 
working a fixed number of hours and not working at all. Rather than deciding whether to 
work or not, the individual would find it optimal to randomize her decision, i.e. engaging 
in an employment lottery. This makes households receive different labor incomes ex post, 
and thus gives rise to extrinsic labor-income uncertainty.
6 When markets are incomplete 
in the sense that there is neither an insurance market nor a set of contingent-claims 
markets (where the household can diversify income risk), it is optimal for the government 
then to use corrective taxes for the missing markets.
7  
However, the role of labor-income taxation in a complete-markets environment 
has not been fully explored in the literature. We show that the second-best labor-income 
tax may be positive in the steady state even when markets are complete.
8 In particular, we 
establish that the optimal labor-income tax is positive (negative) if leisure is normal 
(inferior). This is true in a steady state, as well as for a period of time out of the steady 
state. If leisure is normal, the income effect of a positive labor-income tax makes the 
individual choose a higher probability of work, which enhances the tax base. In a second-
best world, the fiscal authority can take advantage of this income effect by imposing a 
positive wage-income tax. We also establish the connection between the household’s 
demand for a positive unemployment  insurance and the normality of leisure. 
Next, we work out several examples using a wide range of preferences, including 
both additively separable and non-separable leisure.  We establish that the HARA class of 
                                                            
6 This happens even though there is no intrinsic uncertainty in the sense that preferences, endowment and 
technology are non-stochastic. Shell and Wright (1993) establish in a static model that this extrinsic 
uncertainty in labor income due to indivisible labor gives rise to a nondegenerate sunspot equilibrium when 
individual can randomize the labor supply.   
7 This has been explored in the literature on risk sharing. There, even without a government revenue 
constraint, a labor tax may be levied. The labor tax then corrects for a market failure (a missing insurance 
market). In a two-period setting, Hamilton (1987) demonstrates that the optimal wage tax is positive if the 
second period labor income is uncertain. The issue is indirectly dealt in the macroeconomics literature 
concerning debt non-neutrality. Chan (1983) and Barsky et al. (1986), as well as Basu (1996), examine the 
debt non-neutrality hypothesis when future income is uncertain. Although none of these models explicitly 
deals with the labor-supply decision, there is one common result: Taxing future income at a flat rate would 
be welfare improving if markets were unable to fully insure households from future income risk. 
8 As expected, we find that the second-best capital-income tax is zero at the steady state.   4 
preferences (i.e. preferences with Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion) is  both necessary 
and sufficient for insurance to be a constant fraction of after-tax labor income. For these 
preferences we show that a single parameter determines the demand for insurance and the 
sign of the optimal labor tax. We derive the dynamic path of the labor tax in this case. We 
also consider a generalized exponential class of preferences and obtain the robust 
conclusion that labor should be taxed when leisure is a normal good. The optimal labor-
income tax is zero in the short and long run only for the watershed case where leisure is 
neutral. Using an illustrative example, we find a close relationship between the 
individual’s consumption smoothing motive and the degree of normality of leisure.  
The paper is organized as follows. The following section presents the model.   
Section 3 derives the optimal-tax implications in a second-best world.  Section 4 derives 
a class of parametric preferences and presents examples of the time path of the optimal 
labor tax. Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2. AN ECONOMY WITH INDIVISIBLE LABOR 
 
2.1. Individual Economic Behavior. Following Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988), we 
consider an economy where labor supply is indivisible. The consumption set is restricted 
so that that the individuals can work either full time, h0 or not at all. Households have 
access to an insurance market where they can buy insurance. In each period the 
household member engages in an employment lottery, choosing the probability of 
working, α (t), and the probability of not working, (1-α (t)). This makes her wage income 
uncertain. She has access to an insurance market where she buys unemployment 
insurance, y(t). The household’s consumption (c
s(t)) and asset accumulation ( ) (t as ! ) are 
thus contingent on whether the household works (s=1) or not (s=2).  There is no intrinsic 
uncertainty, which means that preferences and technology are non-stochastic. The 
household thus maximizes the following life-time expected utility
9 
(1)  () () [] dt   t c u t h , t c u t   e        a J t     -
0 y c,








                                                            
9 Since there is no intrinsic uncertainty, lifetime utility is the discounted sum of expected utility at each 
date. The household chooses a randomized labor supply, α (t), given the state of the economy at date t 
summarized by the wealth a(t).     5 
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where a(t) equals the sum of outstanding public debt, b(t), and the capital stock, k(t), that 
earn the after-tax interest at rate ρ (t)= (1-τ
K(t))r(t), and ω (t)= (1-τ
L(t))w(t) is the after tax 
wage;  r(t) and w(t) are the rental- and wage-rates, respectively, τ
K(t) and τ
L(t) are the 
proportional tax rates on capital- and labor-income, respectively, and p(α (t)) is the 
competitive price of  insurance. The insurance company behaves competitively and 
maximizes the expected profit, p(α (t))y(t)-(1-α (t))y(t), which gives rise to the zero-profit 
condition, p(α (t))=1-α (t).
10 
Substituting the zero-profit condition into (2) and (3), the current value Hamiltonian 
of the representative household can be written as:  
 
(5)  H=α (t)u(c
1(t), 1-h0) + (1-α (t))u(c
2(t),1)  
               
             + α (t) q
1(t) [ρ (t)a(t)+ω (t)h0-(1-α (t)y(t)-c
1(t)] 
 
        +  (1-α (t)) q




The first order conditions are (subscripts denoting partial derivatives): 
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10 The household randomizes the labor supply decision in this setting by choosing a probability of work 
α (t). A realistic description of this arrangement is that the representative household consists of a family of 
N members. In each period the household decides the proportion, α (t), of members working. The labor 
supply is then α (t)h0N. The household can buy insurance on a competitive market to fully diversify the 
income uncertainty arising from (1-α (t))N of its members not working. After choosing the probability of 
work, α (t) the household is pre-committed to it and cannot renege. This rules out adverse selection in the 
model.        6 
(8)  0 ) ( ) (
) (
2 1 = − =
∂
∂





Using (6), (7) and (8) it follows that  
 
(9) ) ( ) 1 ), ( ( ) 1 ), ( ( 2
0
1 t q t c u h t c u c c = = −  
 
which gives the optimal time paths of state-contingent consumption, c
1(q(t)) and c
2(q(t)), as 
functions the co-state variable q(t). In other words, by buying insurance, the individual 
equalizes the marginal utilities across states. However, this does not necessarily imply that 
household will equalize consumption across states. For consumption equalization, one 
requires an additional restriction on the preferences that the utility function is additively 
separable between consumption and leisure, meaning uc(1-h)=0. It turns out that without any 
such restriction on the preference, the household will not choose to have full insurance as in 
Hansen (1985). This can be seen from (6), (7), and (8). Since 1-h0 is not equal to unity, c
1 
cannot equal c
2 unless uc(1-h) is equal to 0. Next, since q
1(t)=q
2(t) it follows that the optimal 
asset holding decisions must satisfy: 
(10a) ) ( ) ( 2 1 t a t a ! ! = , 
(10b)  ) ( )) ( ( ) ( t q t t q ρ − θ = ! . 
An individual’s asset accumulation is thus independent of her employment history. This 
implies that individuals starting with the same a0 will have the same a(t) at all t, regardless 
of their employment history. Substituting (10a) in (2) and (3) gives  
(11) )) ( ( )) ( ( ) ( ) ( 1 2
0 t q c t q c h t t y − + ω =  
 
Notice now that the household chooses full insurance if the optimal consumption bundles 
are such that c
1(q(t)) = c
2(q(t)). In the absence of any restriction on y(t), the household can 
choose to have positive, negative or zero insurance. 
11 Finally, the optimal choice of α (t) 
must be such that  
 
                                                            
11 One needs to be careful about the non-negativity constraint on consumption while thinking about 
negative unemployment benefit. y(t) can be negative as long as c
2(t) is non-negative. We assume interior 
solutions, meaning c
2(t)>0.     7 
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which upon the use of (11) can be rewritten as:  
 
(12') ) ( ) ( ) 1 )), ( ( ( ) 1 )), ( ( ( 0
1 2 t y t q h t q c u t q c u = − − .    
 
The household chooses to buy a positive insurance, y(t), if the utility gain from not working 
balances the utility cost of the insurance purchase. 
 
2.2  Production. There is a large number of competitive firms in the economy each 
operating under the following constant returns-to-scale technology:   
 
(13) f (k(t), α (t)h0) = f1·k(t) + f2·α (t)h0 
 
2.3.  The Government. The government taxes labor and capital income to finance an 
exogenously specified sequence of public spending, g(t), the use of which, as in Chamley 
(1986), is not explicitly modeled. It adjusts two tax rates, τ
L(t) and τ
K(t), continuously. The 
government is assumed to borrow and lend freely at the market rate of interest, r(t). The 
government's budget constraint is, therefore, given by: 
(14) ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 0
.
t g h t t w t t a t r t t b t r b L k + α τ − τ − =    
with b(0)=b0. 
 
2.4. Equilibrium. The equilibrium is characterized by the following conditions: 
(a) Facing w(t), r(t), τ
L(t), τ
K(t),  the household chooses optimal sequences of c(t), a(t), α (t), 
y(t)  that solves the problem stated in (1), (2) and (3).
12    
(b) Given an exogenous steam of government spending, g(t), the government pre-commits 
to a tax sequence, τ
L(t) and τ
K(t),  and a debt sequence, b(t), that satisfies the government 
budget constraint (14).  
                                                            
12 We assume no-Ponzi games.    8 
(c) Goods, labor, rental markets clear meaning  
(15) ) ( ) ( )] ( 1 [ ) ( ) ( ) ) ( ), ( ( ) ( 2 1
0 t g t c t t c t h t t k f t k − α − − α − α = ! , 
(16) ) ) ( ), ( ( )) ( 1 ( ) ( 0 2 h t t k f t t L α τ − = ω , 
(17) ) ) ( ), ( ( )) ( 1 ( ) ( 0 1 h t t k f t t K α τ − = ρ , 
Notice that the equilibrium level of employment, h(t) ( 0 ) ( h t α ≡ ) is determined by 
the time path of the probability of work, α (t).  The equilibrium time path of α (t) can be 
determined in two steps.  First, using (12) one determines the market clearing after tax 
wage, ω (t) as a function of q(t). Define that equilibrium wage function as:  
(18) )) ( ( ) ( t q t Ω = ω . 
 
Next, using (16) and (18), one can characterize the path of α (t) as a function of k(t), q(t), 
and τ
L(t) as follows:  
(19) )) ( ), ( ), ( ( ) ( t q t t k t L τ α = α . 
 
PROPOSITION 1. In equilibrium, y(t)>0, if and only if, leisure is normal at  date t; y(t)<0, 
if and only if, leisure is inferior at date t. 
 
PROOF. See the Appendix. 
 
Positive insurance demand and normality of leisure are inextricably connected.
13 To see the 
intuition, start from a scenario where y(t)=0. In this case, the individual is indifferent 
between work and no work (see Equation 12'). Starting from this scenario suppose initial 
wealth a0 increases. A higher wealth makes the consumer value leisure more if leisure is 
normal. The household cannot choose hours of work in this indivisible labor world. The 
only choice is to decrease the probability of work and buy positive insurance in response to 
                                                            
13 In a divisible labor economy, Renström (1999) finds that non-inferiority of leisure is sufficient for wage 
income tax to be positive. In the indivisible-labor setting, normality is both necessary and sufficient for a 
positive labor-income tax.   9 
increase in wealth. This is why a positive insurance demand is associated with a positive 
utility gain from not working as in (12').
14 
     
3. SECOND-BEST OPTIMAL TAXATION 
We now solve for the optimal tax problem for the government for this economy with 
indivisible labor. The government solves a Ramsey problem for pre-committed tax 
sequences, τ
L(t) and τ
K(t),  that maximize the household's utility functional (1) subject to its 
own budget constraint (14), the economy wide resource constraint (15), the first-order 




(20)  0 ) ( ≥ ρ t   
 
Using (16) and (17), and the CRS property of the production function, the government's 
budget constraint, (14), can be rewritten as:  
(21)  () ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 0 0 t g   +     h t  , t k     f   -   h   t t    +    t k   t   +    t b   t t b α ω α ρ ρ = !  
We may write the government's current value Hamiltonian as follows (ignoring the time 
indices from now on):  
(22)  () {}
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In principle, the government faces the states, k, b and q, and chooses the controls ρ  and τ
L. 
For algebraic convenience, we pose the government's problem as follows. The government 
chooses the controls ρ  and α . Then using the equilibrium sequence of α  as in (19), one can 
                                                            
14 The insurance market is added to obtain insights about the relationship between normality of leisure and 
the optimal tax, as well as deriving preference structures for which leisure is normal. One can alternatively 
construct an environment with contingent-claims markets as in Shell and Wright (1993), and derive the 
same equilibrium allocation as a sunspot equilibrium. A proof of this equivalence is available from the 
authors upon request. 
15 No such confiscation constraint is relevant for labor income taxation because if labor income is 
confiscated by the government it is optimal for the household to set α (t)=0 which means no production. On 
the other hand, in principle, the capital income can be confiscated and the government can eventually own 
all the capital to run production.    10 
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3.1.  The Optimal Capital-Income Tax. One may now establish, as in Judd (1985) and 
Chamley (1986), that the optimal capital- income tax is zero in steady state, also in the our 
economy with indivisible labor.  This can be verified as follows. At steady state the 
individual’s marginal utility of consumption is constant over time, implying, by (10b), that 
θ =ρ . This in turn implies, by (27) that µ  is constant in the steady state. With µ  being 
constant (and q constant) equation (23) implies that also λ  is constant in the steady state. 
Setting the time derivative of λ  to zero in (26), and using θ =ρ , gives (ρ -f1)(λ -µ )=0 which 
holds if and only if f1=  ρ  because (λ -µ )>0. We summarize this result in terms of the 
following proposition. 
 
                                                            
16 It is straightforward to verify that for given k and q, α ' (τ
L)<0 and hence α (·) can be inverted with respect 
to τ
L.    11 
PROPOSITION 2. If the indivisible labor economy converges to a steady state 




3.2.  The Optimal Labor-Income Tax. Our primary interest in this paper is to explore 
carefully the optimal labor-tax implications. The problem is complicated by the fact that in 
an economy with indivisible labor and lottery, the consumer has the option to transfer 
consumption not only across dates but also across states.  Whether in the second best, the 
government should tax wage income crucially depends on the household’s risk preference, 
which will determine its demand for insurance. The following proposition states a key 
result about the relationship between the household’s demand for insurance and the second 
best wage taxation.  
 
PROPOSITION 3. Under the second-best tax program, from the date when the no-
confiscation constraint (20) on capital ceases to bind, the optimal wage-income tax is 
positive (negative) if the household’s demand for insurance, y, is positive (negative).  
 
PROOF. See the Appendix. 
 
Thus, there is a direct link between the sign of y and the sign of the labor-income tax. The 
question arises whether the optimal labor-income tax is zero when y=0, the case when 
leisure is neutral. This cannot be directly inferred from Proposition 3, because it is based on 
an equilibrium wage equation subject to the condition that y is non-zero.
17 We next analyze 
a benchmark case when the optimal labor income tax is zero.  
 
PROPOSITION 4.  If the preferences of the consumer are such that the consumer 
chooses to buy zero insurance (meaning y=0), the optimal labor-income tax is zero at all 
dates. 
 
                                                            
17 To see this clearly note that the proof of Proposition 3 rests on the fact that Ω '(q)=-y/qh0, which holds 
when y is non-zero.    12 










= ω −  
It immediately follows that when y=0, f2=ω  which means τ
L=0. Q.E.D. 
 
Notice that the optimal labor tax is zero in this case at all dates. It is not just a steady-state 
result.  
4. PARAMETRIC EXAMPLES 
 
In a complete-market environment, whether labor should be optimally taxed or not thus 
depends critically on the household’s demand for unemployment insurance. A natural 
question arises: what class of preferences will give rise to a positive demand for insurance? 
This issue is important because if the benevolent government knows the preferences of 
households, it could resort to second best taxation of labor income appropriately. In this 
section, we derive a class of preferences under which insurance (at each date) is a constant 
fraction of the after-tax wage income: 
where π  is a parameter which can be either positive, negative and zero. The value of π  
determines the sign of the optimal wage income tax. 
 
4.1 Full Insurance. We first establish the benchmark case of full insurance when π =0. We 
have the following result. 
 
PROPOSITION 5. Necessary and sufficient for π =0 is that the utility function u(c,1-
h0) is additively separable in leisure: uc(1-h)=0. 
 
PROOF. If π =0, from (11) and (30) it follows that c
1 = c
2.  Next, note that when c
1 = 
c
2, the only way marginal utilities can be equalized in (9) is by setting uc(1-h)=0. This proves 
necessity. Next we prove the sufficiency. If uc(1-h)=0, then from (9) it follows that c
1 = c
2, 
which upon plugging in (11) and (30), gives π =0. Q.E.D. 
(30)  h - = y 0 ) 1 ( ω π    13 
4.2 HARA Preferences. The additive separable leisure in the utility function is widely used 
in the literature. Note that when utility function is additively separable in leisure, it implies 
that leisure is a normal good. In this case, evidently labor is taxed as per proposition 2. 
However, the converse is not true. For normality of leisure, it is not necessary that uc(1-h)=0. 
We now derive a wide range of preferences involving non-separable leisure that belongs to a 
family of preferences known as the Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion (HARA) class. We 
shall prove now that when  0 ≠ π , such a HARA class of utility functions can encompass 
various possibilities: (a) 0 < π  < 1, partial insurance; (b) π  = 1 no insurance; (c) π  > 1 means 
negative insurance, and (d)  π <0,  over-insurance. 
 
Plugging (30) into (11) to eliminate ω we get 
Plugging (31) into (12') gives 
where ) 1 ) ( ( 0
1 1 h - , q c u u =  and  ) 1 ) ( (
2 2 , q c u u = . Equation (32) holds for all preferences for 
which  0 ≠ π .
18 We wish to find the class of preferences for which π  is constant (i.e. 
independent of q). We have the following lemma. 
 
LEMMA 1. It is necessary that the class of preferences for which  0 ≠ π , satisfies the 
following condition:  
where uc
s and cq
s denote the derivatives of u and c in state  s={1,2}  w.r.t. c and q, 
respectively. 
 
                                                            
18 Note that π =0 cannot be nested under this case, which means additively separable utility function does 
not belong to our derived class of preferences. 
(31)   ) (
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For (34) to be zero, it is necessary that either Jq = 0 or  ∞ = π J . However,  ∞ = π J  would 
mean   
(35)   ∞ = π − − 2 2 1 / ) ( c c q  
q being the marginal utility of consumption cannot be infinity at the optimum. Thus for 
(35) to hold, π  must equal zero, which violates the restriction that  0 ≠ π . Thus it is 
necessary that Jq= 0, which yields (33).  Q.E.D. 
 
LEMMA 2. For  Jq=0  ∀   q,  it is necessary that the utility function is of the 
following Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion (HARA) form:   






s c - + A B - D = h - , c u  
for s={1,2}.  B
s and D
s are constants (possibly dependent of h), with  B>0,  and A is a 
constant independent of h. 
 
   PROOF. Taking the derivative of (9) w.r.t. q gives cq
s(q)= 1/ucc
s, s={1,2}.  Plugging 
this into (33), we get 
Since preferences are state independent (i.e. expected utility) the left- and right-hand sides 
must equal the same constant, (say -A), i.e. 
for  s={1,2}. This means that A and π  cannot be state dependent (i.e. dependent of h). 
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u
u ) 1 ( π − −    15 
We next show that for the class of HARA preferences (36), the constant D is state 
independent (i.e. independent of leisure).   
 




PROOF. Take the derivative of (36)   
Then, by using (9), we find c
s as functions of q: 
Inserting (40) into (36) gives 




Since in the preference class (36), only B
s and c
s can be state dependent, it must be the case 
that B
s is a function of leisure.  Using this insight, define B
s= φ
h, where h can take two 
possible states 0 and h0.  Our next task is to characterize the precise restrictions on π , which 
generates leisure as a “good” (with positive marginal utility) in the utility function. We are 
ready to state a key proposition.  
 
PROPOSITION 6. Necessary and sufficient for insurance to be a constant fraction 
of the after-tax wage income is that the preferences belong to the following class: 
where A and D are constants.  φ
h is a function of leisure as follows: 
(39)  ) ) 1 ( ( ) 1 ( ) 1 /( 1 − π π − s s s s
























(41)  π π π / q B - D = u
- s s s ) ( 1  
 
(42)  ) ) 1 ( ( ) 1 ( ) 1 /( -
h
c - + A - D = h - c, u π π π
π
φ    16 
 (a) If π >0, then φ
h= φ (h), with φ′ (h)>0 and φ′′(h)>0. 
 (b) If π <0, then φ
h=φ (1-h), with φ′ (1-h)>0 and φ′′(1-h)<0. 
PROOF. This can be verified immediately by observing that (a) and (b) hold if, and 
only if,  0 ) 1 , ( ) 1 ( > − − h c u h and, 0 ) 1 , ( ) 1 )( 1 ( < − − − h c u h h . Q.E.D. 
4.3. The Case of Zero Labor-Income Taxation. In the next step we derive a subclass of 
preferences from the HARA class for which labor should not be taxed at the second-best 
optimum.  This is a special case when leisure is neutral.   
PROPOSITION 7.  If the utility function is of the following exponential class 
where D is a constant, and φ
h= φ (h), with φ′ (h)>0 and φ′′(h)>0, then the optimal labor-
income tax is zero at all dates. 
PROOF. Recall from Proposition 3 that when the individual takes no insurance, the 
optimal wage tax is zero.  In the present context, y=0 if π =1 (see equation 30).  Take limits 
of (42) as π→ 1 (which requires setting A equal to unity) and apply l’Hôpital’s rule to obtain 
(43). Q.E.D. 
 
4.4. Why Does Normality of Leisure Mean a Positive Tax on Labor? We have found that 
whether labor should be taxed or not depends on whether the individual demands positive 
insurance or not, which in turn depends on whether leisure is normal or inferior.  A 
relationship thus exists between normality of leisure and the insurance demand via the 
individual’s preferences. To see this connection clearly, differentiate (19) with respect to 
τ
L(t), (keeping k(t) constant), to obtain the following useful decomposition of a change in 
tax rate, τ
































(43)  e - D = h - c, u c - h φ ) 1 (    17 
The first term in (44) represents the compensated labor-supply response when the 
tax rate changes (the substitution effect). If q(t) is held constant, it follows from (18) that 
ω (t) is also constant and it is straightforward to verify from (16) that the first term is:  
f2/[(1-τ
L)f22·h0], and is negative. This substitution effect thus captures the distortionary 
effect of the wage-income tax. As far as this substitution effect is concerned, a higher 
labor tax lowers labor supply and thus lowers the tax base.  
The second term in (44) reflects the income effect of a change in the wage tax 
rate, which works through the effect of τ
L(t) on α (t) via its effect on q(t). When τ
L(t) is 
higher, it lowers the permanent income of the household, thus lowering consumption in 
both states for given α (t). The marginal utility of consumption, q(t), thus rises, which 
means 0 ) ( / ) ( > τ ∂ ∂ t t q L . A loss of permanent income (represented by higher q(t)) would 
boost the labor supply, α (t), if leisure is a normal good.  Next, verify that  (44)  can be 
rewritten as: 
19






























The normality of leisure (π <1) thus makes the income effect of a higher wage tax 
positive. This positive income effect tends to increase the tax base (w(t)α (t)h0) when τ
L(t) 
rises, which countervails the distortionary effect of a higher τ
L(t). The government can 
thus tax labor more in those economies.  On the other hand, if π >1, leisure is inferior. The 
income effect is then negative, reinforcing the distortionary effect of wage taxation.  In this 
case, the government should subsidize labor.  
 
4.5. Constant Relative Risk Aversion. Why does the individual buy positive insurance when 
leisure is normal?  To get further intuition about this, consider a special case of HARA (36) 
when  A=0. Utility function then reduces to an iso-elastic type, which is known as the 
constant relative risk aversion class. We have the following lemma concerning the elasticity 
of interstate substitution (call it σ  hereafter).   
 
                                                            
19 To see this, insert (30) into (56) and use (16) to obtain ∂α (t)/∂ q(t)= - (1-π )f2/f22 q(t) h0.    18 
LEMMA 4. For a specific class of HARA utility functions with A=0, the elasticity of 
interstate substitution (σ ) is given by 1-π  > 0. 
 































Using (42) gives σ  = 1-π . Furthermore, we must have π <1 when A=0, otherwise positive 
marginal utility, uc>0, is violated.  Q.E.D. 
 
The elasticity of interstate substitution in consumption, is uniquely identified by π  in this 
example. It reflects the household’s desire to equalize marginal utilities of consumption 
across states, and thus uniquely identifies the household’s propensity to buy insurance. For 
normal leisure, π <1, the individual buys positive insurance to equalize marginal utilities of 
consumption across states. The greater the π , the smaller the elasticity of interstate 
substitution, and the lower the insurance demand.   The individual is more averse to transfer 
consumption from employed to unemployed state when σ  is smaller, and that is why she 
demands less insurance.  
 
To summarize, the HARA class of preferences (42) thus encompasses a variety of 
utility functions, and thus covers a wide range of optimal taxation schemes. These cases 
include: (a) constant relative-risk-aversion when A=0, in which case the optimal labor tax 
is positive, (b) constant absolute-risk-aversion (negative exponential) when π =1, where 
the optimal labor tax is zero, and (c) quadratic when π =2 (where  ) ( max t c A
t
> ), in which 
case the optimal labor tax is negative (i.e. a subsidy). 
 
4.6. Transitional Dynamics of the Wage-Income Tax in the HARA Case. We shall now 
analyze the transitional dynamics of labor income tax for the range of preferences discussed 
earlier.  Using (29) one obtains   19 
then taking the time derivative of (46) using (10b), (26), and (27), one obtains:  
The Appendix outlines the steps in deriving the second equality. Based on the second 
equality in (46), and the fact that q-µ >0, and λ -µ >0, we have the following proposition. 
 
PROPOSITION 8. If π <1 labor is taxed (at least from the date at which the non-
confiscation constraint does not bind), and the wage tax is increasing as long as capital is 
taxed.  If π =1 labor is always untaxed. If π  >1 labor is subsidized (at least from the date at 
which the non-confiscation constraint does not bind), and the subsidy is increasing as long 
as capital is taxed.
20 
 
4.7. A Generalized Exponential Class of Preferences: A Case of Non-HARA Preferences. 
The upshot of our analysis is that labor should be optimally taxed if leisure is normal.  This 
has been verified for preferences involving additive separable leisure, and a HARA class of 
preferences with non-additive leisure. We will now give an example of non-HARA 
preferences, which we call generalized exponential preferences, resulting in zero taxation 
of labor. We have the following proposition.  
 
PROPOSITION 9. Let the utility function be of the following form:  
(48)  U(c,h) = -(exp(-λ c) + κ )φ (h), 
with φ (.)>0, φ '(.)>0, and λ>0. Then sign(y) = sign(κ ).  
 
PROOF. For the present parametric specification, (9) implies 
                                                            
20 When π =1, the non-confiscation constraint is binding for a period t∈[0,T
*), and capital income is taxed at 
100%. From T
* and onwards, capital is untaxed, and the economy is at its steady state level. T
* is a function of the 
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and (12')  reduces to 










 κ + − λ − λ − ) ( ) 0 ( 0
1 2
 
Using (49) in (50) gives 
(51)  κ [φ (h0)-φ (0)] = yq 
Since φ '(.)>0, the term within square brackets is positive, and by (9), q>0, thus sign(y) = 
sign(κ ). Q.E.D. 
 
It is now straightforward to verify the following corollary using Proposition 1. 
 
COROLLARY.  For this generalized exponential class of preferences,  κ >(<)0  is 
necessary and sufficient for leisure to be normal (inferior).  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we address the issue of optimal wage taxation in a dynamic complete-markets 
setting. The issue of optimal labor-income taxation is a relatively ignored area of research 
in dynamic tax theory. We find that the second-best labor-tax depends crucially on the 
degree of complementarity between consumption and leisure. If leisure is a not neutral, 
there is scope for government intervention in the form of labor taxation or subsidy in a 
complete market environment. We investigated this question in a fairly general setting with 
preferences allowing non-separability between consumption and leisure. Our conclusion is 
that labor should be taxed if leisure is normal. The optimal wage tax is zero only for a 
watershed case where leisure is neutral. The case of a wage subsidy arises in an implausible 
scenario where leisure is inferior, implying that the individual buys negative 
unemployment insurance. The results obtained here provide useful guidance in designing 
optimal tax policy in a dynamic environment. A useful extension of this paper would be to 
investigate similar issues in a third-best environment where the government may not 
necessarily commit to a specific tax design.    21 
APPENDIX 
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION  1. First note that leisure in an indivisible labor 







 <0, which means the household chooses a lower probability of 













































Next note by the application of Envelope property of the value function J(a0) in (1) that  
















.  From (52), it means that  























sign    
Using (12) and (16), define the following implicit function (time indices suppressed)   




1 q c q c h h k f q q c U h q c U q G L − + α τ − + − − = α  
Using the implicit function theorem and (9) one obtains, 
(56)  
2

















    







 is negative, zero or positive if and only y(t) is 
positive, negative or zero.  Q.E.D. 
 










= ω −  
   22 
Premultiply (24) by q and exploiting the fact that Ω '(q)= [c
1-c
2-ω h0]/qh0, one obtains 
 (58)   [] 2 1
0
2 1 ] ) 1 ( )[ ( c c h q c q c q q q q q + − ω µα + α − + α − λ + ρψ = ψ!  
Next note that  
(59)   () q q q q q
dt
d
) ( ρ − θ ψ + ψ = ψ + ψ = ψ ! ! !  
Plugging (59) into (58) gives 
(60)   [] [] 2 1
0
2 1 ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( c c h q c q c q q q
dt
d
q q + − ω µα + α − + α − λ + θψ = ψ  
Next note that  
(61)   a a a
dt
d ! ! µ + µ = µ ) ( 
Plugging (27) into (61)  
(62)   a a a
dt
d ! µ + ρ − θ µ = µ ) ( ) ( 
Using (2), (3) and (10a), the household's budget constraint can be rewritten as: 
(63)   2 1
0 ) 1 ( c c h a a α − − α − αω + ρ = !  
which after plugging into (62) gives  
(64)     [] 2 1
0 ) 1 ( ) ( c c h a a
dt
d
α − − α − αω µ + θµ = µ  
Next noting that a=b+k, rewrite (25) as 
(65)     a q µ − ψ = ν . 
Taking the time derivative of (65), one obtains 






µ − ψ = ν!  
Using (60) and (64) in (66) one obtains 
(67)     [] 2 2 1
.
) 1 ( ) ( c q c q c q q q µ + α − + α − λ + θν = ν  
Chamley (1986) shows that the confiscation constraint, (20) cannot be binding forever. In 
our case, if it is binding forever, consumption falls to zero in both states. Suppose that it 
ceases to bind at date t1. Since ν  is the multiplier associated with the confiscation 
constraint, (20), this implies that    23 
(68)   0 ) ( ) ( = ν = ν t t !  
for  1 t t ≥ . Plugging (68) into (67) and simplifying terms, we get: 










for   1 t t ≥ . Plugging (69) into (57), one obtains 
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Since λ >0 and µ <0 and cq
1<0, and cq
2< 0 (by concavity of u), it follows that the sign of 
(f2-ω ) is the same as the sign of y.  Hence, the labor income tax is positive (negative) 
when y> (<) 0.   Q.E.D. 
 
 
DERIVATION OF EQUATION (36). Inverting (38) gives 
for s={1,2}. Or equivalently 
(72)  
c d
c - + A   d
 
-
  -   =  
c d





c ) ) 1 ( ln(
1
1 ) ln( π
π
 
Integrating both sides with respect to c
s gives 
where M
s is any constant, possibly dependent on s. 
Taking exponents of both sides gives 
where B
s=exp{M
s}, and consequently is positive. 
Integrating both sides with respect to c
s finally gives 
(71) ] ) 1 ( /[ 1 c - + A - = u / u s s
c
s
cc π  
(73)  ) ) 1 ( ln(
1
1
) ln( c - + A  
-




(74)  ) ) 1 ( ( ) 1 /( 1 π π - - s s s
c c - + A B   =   u    24 
where D
s is any constant, possibly dependent on s. Q.E.D. 
 
 
DERIVATION OF EQUATION (46). Note that  
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Next plug in (10b), (26) and (27) into the right hand side of (76) to obtain (47).  Q.E.D. 




s s c - + A B   -   D   =   u    25 
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